Abstract: Agamist a background of institutional change and organizational reform we analyze to what degree the Commission bureaucracy is politicized. Politicization is defined as the substitution of political criteria for merit-based criteria in the selection, retention, promotion and disciplining of members of the public service. As vantage point serve the concepts of direct and professional politicization. The empirical data used is taken from recent online and semistructured surveys of Commission officials. We show that the Commission's bureaucrats, although they are highly sensible for the political side of their job, are less "politicized" today, i.e. after the Kinnock reform, than in the past. While the College of the Commission appears to have indeed become more politically dependent upon its supranational peers, the Commission's bureaucracy remains rather less than more politicized. We conclude by discussing the implications of depoliticized Commission civil service under an ever more political College.
Introduction
Max Weber was the first to systematically theorize about the nexus between the political and administrative sphere of public bureaucracies. He predicted that bureaucratization would remain a defining feature of our societies-as long as industrial transformation and division of labor progressed. However, Max Weber and the 20th century public administration theorists following him focused exclusively on administrative developments within nation states. Bureaucratic structures which emerged in the meantime between states, i.e. at international level received comparatively little attention. Although academic interest in (what could be called) a "comparative international administrative science" has recently increased, 1 our knowledge about administrative features of international bureaucracies rests theoretically as well as empirically on precariously thin grounds. Such neglect is odd for at least two reasons. First, there is a global trend of an ever increasing number of international organizations (IOs) throughout the last century (Wallace and Singer 1970: 277; Pevehouse, Nordstrom and Warnke 2005: 13) and their bureaucratic apparatus as well as their substantial competences have increased considerably, too (Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Mayntz 2002) . 2 Second, the transformation of government to governance, in particular in its multileveled version, stresses the importance of technocratic expertise as a crucial resource in policy-making and can thus be taken as encouragement to re-visit questions concerning the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats especially at the international level (Kohler-Koch and Eising 1999; Benz et al. 2007; Rhodes and Bevir 2010) .
We want to add to this discussion by analyzing the politics-administration nexus within the European Commission. As vantage point serve the concepts of direct and professional politicization. Generally politicization has been defined as "the substitution of political criteria for merit-based criteria in the selection, retention, promotion and disciplining of members of the public service" (Peters 2011 ; see also Rouban 2003: 313) . Direct politicization can be conceived as the top-down ability of political superiors to decide about recruitment and promotion by considering non-merit characteristics of officials (in particular at the higher echelons of the services); such direct politicization has obviously important implications in terms of steering capacity of superiors since it helps assuring bureaucratic compliance. Professional politicization, by contrast, should be understood as the degree of bottom-up responsiveness of bureaucrats towards the political requirements of their job; meaning officials attempt to anticipate policy position of those whom they serve mainly in order to enhance their individual career perspectives. 3 With respect to start studying these forms of politicization at international level the Commission comes close to a most similar case for at least three reasons: first, in size and organizational-structural diversification the Commission already resembles a state ministerial administration and the EU system in which the Commission operates comes close to what we usually expect from a national polity; second as an 1 See for instance Egeberg 2006; Trondal et al. 2010; Trondal 2010 , Bauer 2008b and the contributions in the special issue of the Journal of European Public Policy (volume 15, number 5) published in August 2008. 2 It actually depends a lot what definition of IOs one uses. Some scholars see a decline in the overall number (a 2.9 percent decrease in IO number between the end of the cold war and 2004) but still an increase in IOs bureaucratic apparatus and competences (see Volgy et al. 2008: 847) . 3 For a further differentiation of a top-down and bottom-up understanding politicization, see Clifford and Wright 1997 and Peters and Pierre 2004. international bureaucracy the Commission is general-purpose, i.e. responsible for a huge variety of tasks and polices (as opposed to most other international organizations that are single-purpose); third, its national constituencies are relatively homogeneous making it conceivable that ideological and cross-country party-political cleavages have an impact within the Commission. 4 In sum, if studying politicization in an international bureaucracy is to be meaningful, the European Commission certainly constitutes the "prime suspect".
Apart from such analytical considerations, there is also anecdotic evidence that indicates interesting tension in the relationship between the Commission's administration and its political top. In October 2006, for example, the Commissioner for Enterprise and Industry, Günter Verheugen, publicly criticized top Commission officials for being arrogant, condescending and equipped with far too much power, making them hardly controllable by their political leaders. More such examples could be added. 5 Such allegations may be justified or not, at least they suggest that the relationship between bureaucrats and politicians within the Commission merits closer scrutiny.
The chapter proceeds as follows. After this introduction we put the Commission in its institutional context and discuss particular trends of presidentialization and the changing role of the European Parliament (section 2). In section 3 we summarize the major lines of arguments put forward about the Commission from a public administration perspective. Sections 4 and 5 provide empirical data 6 to assess the Commission bureaucracy's degree of direct and professional politicization. We conclude by discussing the implication of our findings. In a nutshell, we show that the Commission's bureaucrats though they are highly sensible for the political side of their job, are less "politicized" today, i.e. after the Kinnock reform, than in the past (Bauer 2008a (Bauer , 2009 . While the political top of the Commission appears to have indeed become more politically dependent, the Commission's bureaucracy remains highly autonomous, i.e. rather less than more directly politicized. 4 This third expectation is based on the fact that the EU as a regional organization with a territorially restricted membership structure suffers less from collective action problems caused by a large number of highly heterogeneous principals (see e.g. Hooghe, Marks and de Vries 2006; Pollack 1997) . Even though the recent 2004 and 2007 enlargement of the EU may weaken the argument, the EU is still distinctly different from many other international organizations whose members come from various continents and therefore politicization phenomena (as we attempt to study them) are likely to be overshadowed by cultural and socio-economic diversity. 5 The book "The Life of a European Mandarin: Inside the Commission" published in 2007 by current MEP Derk-Jan Eppink is another recent example of serious criticism against the illegitimate rule of Brussels' "Eurocrats". Building on his own professional experience as a cabinet member of Commissioner Bolkestein (1999 Bolkestein ( -2004 and Kallas (2004 Kallas ( -2007 , the author describes instances where high-ranking civil servants have intentionally overloaded apparently weak Commissioners with unimportant work just to keep them out of the way. More generally, the author considers turf wars, insufficient inter-departmental coordination and weak political leadership as the crucial pathologies of Brussels' bureaucracy. 6 Our empirical section draws on data collected as part of the "European Commission in Question" (EUCIQ) project conducted by Hussein Kassim, John Peterson, Michael W. Bauer, Renaud Dehousse, Liesbet Hooghe and Andrew Thompson (see Kassim et al., forthcoming) . For further information, visit http://www.uea.ac.uk/psi/research/EUCIQ. The data used here is the result of an online survey, where we surveyed 1901 permanent Commission officials. In order to enhance reliability and validity of this quantitative data, the online questionnaire was supplemented with 119 semi-structured face-to-face interviews with the senior and middle management of the Commission. A compilation of relevant survey questions can be found in the Annex to this chapter.
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The changing role of the Commission within the political system of the European Union
The Commission is both at the same time: the most important European level administration (in form of its Directorates-General and other services) and an influential political body (in form of the college of Commissioners including the Commission president). Its exclusive right of initiative makes the Commission one of the most innovative institutions the European integration has created. The centrality of the Commission's position within the EU stems from its role of providing leadership, the proposing of legislation and the managing as well as the execution of policies (Docksey and Williams 1994) .
In recent years, however, it has been argued that the Commission has sustained a considerable loss of power accompanied by an increasing importance of the European Parliament (EP) as a legislative actor and supervisor of the executive as well as a Council that defines in ever greater detail the political agenda of the Union (Bauer 2005; Duff 1994 ). To be sure, the Commission still holds the initiative monopoly in growing number of policy areas but the EP is now a more important veto-player and co-decision maker (Wille 2010a; Benedetto and Hix 2007) . The shift of power is perhaps more subtle, but in the eyes of many observers not less pervasive (Peterson 2008) . When analyzing the implications of such a shift in powers, two developments bear particular importance for our research question. First, the EP was given a larger amount of control and scrutiny powers vis-à-vis the Commission induced by changes in the comitology system and increased reporting requirements. Second and in addition to its right to censure the Commission, the Parliament has gained an important say in the inauguration of the Commission's political leaders.
Even though the EP has always been criticizing comitology (Corbett et al. 1995: 253; Bradley 1997; Hix 2001) , the changes made to the procedure in 1999 (intended to increase executive transparency and accountability) provided the EP with a larger amount of available information-something the EP has long fought for. 7 In 2006, the role of the Parliament was further strengthened by the introduction of the 'regulatory procedure with scrutiny' into the comitology system (Bradley 2008) .
Despite the expectation that more information would automatically enhance the control capacities of the parliament (see Héritier 2003; Huber 2000) , the increased amount of information does not mean that the EP has used it to better control the Commission in a day-to-day basis (Brandsma 2010) . Nonetheless, comitology stands for a trend of strengthened power of the EP vis-à-vis the Commission (Franchino 2000) , charging the Commission with stronger information delivery and justification duties. 8 With the Treaty of Lisbon, the comitology procedure is replaced by a new system of delegating legislative powers to the Commission. Within this new constitutional framework the EP is now on the same footing as the Council since both institutions have available strong scrutiny and veto power over the delegated acts (see 7 Under advisory, management and regulatory procedures of comitology, the Commission has to provide the EP with a large amount of information, ranging from the technical aspects of the draft measures (if the legislative act was passed under co-decision) to detailed minutes of meetings, list of participants and final decisions (Hix 2005: 55) . 8 For example, the President of the Commission needs to present the annual work program of the Commission to the EP and throughout the year Commissioners and their management staff must appear before EP committees to report on the Commission's work (progress).
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Article 290 2. (a) and (b)). 9 Secondly, the EP also became more involved in the appointment of the Commission President and individual Commissioners. Since Maastricht (1992) , the term of office of the President of the Commission is aligned with the term of the EP in order to allow the EP to recognize the will of the European citizens when appointing the president. Furthermore, the reform of the investiture procedure established in the Amsterdam treaty (1997) resulted in the formal right of the EP to approve or veto both the Council's nominee for Commission president and the team of Commissioners (Scully 2010: 165; Wonka 2007: 171) . 10 The right to censure the Commission as a whole is another powerful instrument at the hands of the EP. Even the EP has never used such a motion, the threat to do so can be argued to have effectively led to the resignation of the Santer Commission in 1999. As a consequence, the new Commission under Romano Prodi proved increasingly sensitive to the questions and concerns of the EP in the committee hearings, where each Commissioner-designate had to make a statement and answer questions from MEPs (Hix 2005: 61) .
Against the backdrop of increasing importance of the EP (see also Majone 2002) , it is not surprising that this trend had an important impact on the political leadership of the Commission. First, the College under Barroso became more 'politicized' (used here as a synonym for 'politically dependent') and moved further away from the neutral and rather technocratic role envisioned by Jean Monnet. Second, the Commission under Barroso became more presidential and centralized in order to guarantee the adequate political leadership required by the Commission's increasingly political role (Peterson 2008) . The president's role is often described as being a 'first among equals'. It is him who sets the political guidelines of the work of the Commission and decides about the portfolios and the organization of the services. The president has veto power over the appointment of the other commissioners and on his request individual commissioners can be forced to resign (though the majority of the college has to back this request). Despite his consolidated position, however, the president cannot guide and take action against the will of the college. Since 2005, however, the President has assumed greater control over Commission policies. This trend is particularly visible if one looks at the transformation of the role of the Secretariat-General from an instrument of the College into a service and power base of the President (Kurpas et al. 2008: 42) . With the introduction of the 'Strategic Planning and Programming tool' in the framework of the Kinnock reforms, the Secretariat-General now occupies a more pivotal role in the internal coordination process of Commission proposals (Haltlapp, Metz and Rauh 2010) . As powers within 9 See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:083:FULL:EN:PDF (accessed 14 January 2011). 10 The recent confirmation of Barroso as president of the Commission was the first one to where the EP voted on party-ideological lines and not in "grand coalition" between the European Peoples Party and Socialists. 11 To be sure, increasing politicization of the Commission College could already be observed under the leadership of Jacques Delors (Drake 1995; Ludlow 1991) but then lost momentum under its later presidents which nurtured the fear among MEPs that the Commission could retreat to its previous, largely bureaucratic role (Christiansen 1997: 77) .
the Commission became more centralized and SPP finally unfolded its effects, Barroso appears increasingly able to steer the process of proposal development at a very early stage. The enlargement is also argued to have strengthened the President's role (Peterson 2008) and Barroso moved from being a 'primus inter pares' to a 'primus super pares' (Kurpas et al. 2008: 32) .
In sum, three interrelated trends can be highlighted in the recent literature on the Commission's role in the political system of the EU. First, the Commission is subject to increased scrutiny by the European Parliament, effectively reducing its powers and autonomy within the inter-institutional triangle. Second, the Commission's leadership is being pushed towards a more political role in the sense that it has to take into account a variety of political interests that more and more interfere with the rather neutral and technocratic aspects of policy initiation and implementation. Third, the powers within the Commission College became more centralized under the Commission president. Since the concept of politicization of the Commission bureaucracy, to which we now turn, is in essence relational, it is important to keep in mind these overall trends that affect the Commission as part of the central supranational power triangle (Commission, Parliament and Council).
The Commission as a public administration
The Commission always received huge attention as a political actor at the supranational level. The academic interest in the European Commission as a supranational administration however has rather been scarce. Early works (Michelmann 1978; Coombes 1970 ) did not produce a sustained research perspective. After a longer period of academic dearth in the 1980s, administrative research on the Commission gained momentum only in the 1990s-when leadership problems (Ludlow 1991 ) and an internal management or implementation deficit (Metcalfe 1992 (Metcalfe , 1996 (Metcalfe , 2000 Laffan 1997 Laffan , 1998 Levy 1997; Bauer 2001) were diagnosed. It was the dramatic resignation of the Santer Commission in 1999 and the subsequent 'Kinnock reform' 12 that increased the interest in the Commission as a bureaucracy (see Bauer 2007) . The most important changes introduced by the reform concern two different management dimensions, i.e. strategic planning and human resource management (see Bauer  2008a ). The reform chapter on 'Strategic Planning and Programming' was a first cornerstone of the administrative modernisation project. The intention was to replace the traditional way of administrating with strategic priority setting (on the basis of updated information about what exactly is done in the Commission and by whom), respective resource allocation, process monitoring, evaluation and -inherently related to these -redistribution of financial and personnel resources on the basis of this programming cycle. All in all, output-oriented steering and 'management by objectives' were introduced to replace some of the apparently inefficient aspects of the principle of Weberian organization (characterised by input management and a strict division of labour). The personnel chapter was the second centrepiece of the modernization blueprint, given that budgeting, programming and coordination aspects have personnel implications, which, almost by definition, are the core determinants of a shift in the degree of direct politicization as we will later argue. 13 The linearization of careers and the new pension regime aimed to keep staff motivated until very late into their individual careers (more but smaller promotion steps) and to keep the costs for salaries and pensions in check. Another core aspect of the new personnel strategy was an extended, decentralised leadership role. The top management was empowered to vertically set priorities and to monitor (and intervene, if necessary) early on in horizontal coordination and in the entire administrative policy production process. This also means that lower layers in the hierarchy have to provide (much more rigorously than in the past) the necessary information in a continuous and comprehensive way in order to enable senior managers to analyse, assess and potentially intervene with greater precision and effect. This development is exemplarily visible if we look at the new role of the Head of Unit who turned into a key figure within the process of implementing the new personnel policy and received much more management responsibilities than before.
To sum up, the Kinnock reform was not the first, but the first serious, far reaching and coherent endeavour to modernize the Commission. 14 Owing to the changes in strategic and personnel management, the relationship of bureaucrats and politicians as the focal point of this chapter appears to have changed significantly and thus necessitates an empirical assessment of how the reform impacts on the politicization of the Commission administration. Despite substantial analysis of the process, scope and implementation of the reform (Kassim 2004a (Kassim , 2004b Cini 2004; Levy 2004 Levy , 2006 Stevens and Stevens 2006; Spence and Stevens, 2006) , the effects of administrative change, however, are so far not sufficiently understood (Bauer 2009: 2) .
With respect to the structure of the Commission's bureaucracy, it is organized similar to national ministries (Egeberg 2010: 133) . While the political leadership (the College of Commissioners and their Cabinets) are subject to parliamentary scrutiny (see section 2) and collectively agrees on policy initiatives, each of the 27 Commissioners assumes oversight and policy responsibility for the work of his/her Directorate-General (DG). There are more than 30 such Directorates-General and other services, responsible for agriculture, cohesion policy, environment to legal service and translation. More than 40.000 officials and non-permanent staff are working in Brussels (and to a limited extent in Luxembourg and the other sites of the Commission) forming what we call the Commission's bureaucracy. To pin the Commission bureaucracy against the Commission leadership might seem empirically simplistic (Hooghe 2001: 197-201) . However, it analytically helps to focus the relationship between the two sets of actors (Hix 2005 : 40f, see also Mayntz 1985 . While the hybrid character of the Commission as an organization is acknowledged in many studies (see Peterson 2006: 80-82) , it should be highlighted that the Kinnock reforms appear to have altered the relationship between politicians and civil servants further. In this regard, a recent study concluded that "what is perhaps most distinctive about the 'new' [Barosso I] Commission is how far the two halves of the hybrid had drifted apart" (Peterson 2008: 767) .
In sum, it should have become clear that whatever is produced by the Commission in terms of policy proposal, management or implementation supervision, it is its staff that collects information, prepares policy drafts, implements political directives from the College. It is thus of great concern whether and to what extent one can detect politicization within its bureaucracy. With the help of the concepts of direct and professional politicization, we now attempt to shed light on the crucial relationship between the administrative and political parts of the European Commission.
Direct politicization within the Commission
Direct politicization can be conceived as the substitution of political criteria for merit-based criteria in the selection and the promotion of members of the public service (Peters 2011) . Of particular interest is in that context how promotions into top jobs of the bureaucracy are handled. In theory, the purpose of direct politicization is to assure compliance of the service with the political preferences of its political leaders.
What might be 'political criteria' with respect to the European Commission administration? First, given our discussion of the role of the Commission in the EU system and our diagnosis of increasing politicization of the College, it might well be that similar ideological or party politicization also affects the Commission services. Second, given the sensibilities of the supranational institutions for (particular) national positions, it may well be that within the Commission nationality politics occupies the role that in national civil services is usually hold by party politics. Do we find evidence for either?
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Asked how important is party affiliation or sympathy in the Commission 74 percent of the interviewed middle and senior Commission managers say that "party affiliation is not important" or even that "it does not play a role at all". Only five percent think "it is important", while 21 percent of the managers say it may "sometimes be important and sometimes not". Party membership is even more alien to the European civil servants. Only nine percent of our sample said they are an active or passive member of a national political party. 15 Compared to the top-level ministerial bureaucracy of Germany, for instance, this is a very low value. 16 In relative terms, thus, one can say that with respect to party membership and party affiliation the Commission appears much less directly "politicized" than any central administration of the EU member states. Can we take this as evidence for the irrelevance of party-politics for the work of Commission officials, or should we suspect underreporting in our survey due to a social desirability effect (i.e. that officials would not report their party membership for privacy reasons)? Our online survey contained a question which we can use as "control". The officials were asked about the basis of their professional network within the Commission (see Suvarieol 2008). Party-political contact ranked low. Only 19% said that ideology or party affiliation would play a role in their individual networking.17 Thus our data (directly and indirectly) indicates that party politics is of little relevance in the daily life of Commission officials. However, what came out to be more as twice as important than ideology and party affiliation for the individual networking was nationality (52 percent). Hence, the irrelevance of party politics is supported, but can it be that nationality politics in the Commission became what party politics is for national civil services?
In contrast to party politicization, the intra-organizational handling of staffs' nationality is a highly disputed aspect of human resource management in the Commission. This is mainly because member states demand that "an appropriate" number of their citizens are employed within the Commission civil service. Similar to what classically has been discussed under the heading of "representative bureaucracy" one reason for this demand is certainly that in way of such "representation" national cultures and positions are assumed to be taken into consideration.18 The underlying dilemma of administrative neutrality on the one hand and member states' desire for (passive) bureaucratic representation on the other hand has often created frictions between international organizations and their constituents (Beigbeder 1988; Weiss 1975:62-68) . This applies also to the European Commission (Egeberg 2006) .19 In the EU administrations (not just in the Commission) the national concern of appropriate "bureaucratic representation" has always been recognized in Commission's Staff Regulations. Article 27 determines that "[r]ecruitment shall be directed to securing for the institution the services of officials of the highest standard of ability, efficiency and integrity, recruited on the broadest possible geographical basis from among nationals of Member States of the Communities. No posts shall be reserved for nationals of any specific Member State" (Commission 2004: I -14; emphasis added).
So, there is a formal encouragement (though no fixed quota) that nationality is taken into consideration. The question then is do we find evidence that 'the broadest possible geographical basis' leads to a purposeful substitution of merit criteria for nationality criteria? Proper empirical data to answer this question is difficult to find. However, if in selecting and promoting civil servants nationality is taken as unjustified political criteria, this should leave "observable" traces in our survey-as career civil servants are probably unhappy with this. And indeed, the acceptance of the 17 In order to secure comparability with question Q1 and Q2, we restrict the calculation of percentages to the responses of middle and senior management. For further details, see Annex Q3. 18 Kingsley was the first to write about bureaucratic representation. He argues that in order to prevent a bias in the making and implementation of public policies members of the bureaucracy should be drawn proportionally from the major layers of the population (Kingsley 1944) . Mosher (1968) further specified the original concept by distinguishing between passive and active representation. Whereas passive representation refers to the fact that the origin of civil servants should simply mirror the different layers of society, active representation highlights that civil servants are actively pushing for the interest of 'their' social class (Mosher 1968: 11) . The principle of "the broadest geographical basis" can thus be understood as a means to guarantee at least passive representation of member states in the Commission bureaucracy and increase the merits associated with representativeness such as legitimacy, responsibility and responsiveness to the needs of European citizens. The question of whether or not active representation can also be expected, however, is far from clear in the case of the Commission bureaucracy. 19 Liesbet Hooghe (1999) called this the tradeoff between consociational and Weberian principles in the Commission's handling of staff multi-nationality. geographical balance principle among Commission staff is relatively weak. Only 35 percent of the 1658 respondents (distributed about equally to hierarchical ranks) indicate in the online survey that they actually agree that posts in the Commission should be distributed on the basis of geographical balance. 48 percent are opposed to such a distribution while 17 percent are indifferent.20 So, we can say that the problem as such is of some concern to the Commission staff. Face-to-face interviews however showed overall acceptance of the principle of geographical balance-with the condition that merit should come first, i.e. that geographical balance is not the sole criteria for selection or promotion.
Moreover, interviewees admit that national governments do indeed "lobby" for their national candidates to get into top positions; however, national governments can only do so where the right "constellation" opens (i.e. an appropriate national candidate is available and the direct environment of the vacancy does not already contain too many "own" nationals). In other words, it is very difficult for a national government to orchestrate Commission promotion procedures according to their preference in order to achieve exploitable strategic gains. To have chances to be "successful" national governments have to support well-qualified candidates in promising constellations and they can rarely afford to just follow their actual political interests and personnel preferences. In sum, the "remoteness of Brussels" and the fact that national governments can only indirectly try to influence important promotions sets a natural limit to the systematically exploitable substitution of merit criteria for political criteria.
We can cross-check the robustness of this finding of low salience of nationality politicization with another question from the survey. The civil servants were asked whether they think it problematic for Commission officials to manage dossiers of special interest to their "own" member state. More than half of the respondents (51 percent, no major differences between hierarchical ranks) think it is not problematic if civil servants handle dossiers of special interest to their home country. Just 34 percent have some concerns that there might be conflict of interest.21 In face-to-face follow up interviews, we confronted the senior and middle managers with these results and asked if this picture was a surprise to them. Most of them said they were not surprised and emphasized the advantage when civil servants dealing with dossiers of their country of origin-especially if that country has a rare language and yet little organizational memory about its institutional set-up exists within the Commission. These are conditions which do obviously apply to many countries from recent enlargements. Furthermore, respondents often argue that the rules supporting multinationality in the DGs, i.e. shared responsibility for a dossier and the monitoring and reporting practices, make potential national bias a negligible issue.
There are also rules-introduced in recent years-that aim at "defusing" the perils of nationality politicization, i.e. a new Director-General cannot have the same nationality than their predecessor and a Commissioner's cabinet has to be decisively multinational (Egeberg and Heskestad 2010) .
In sum, nationality in Brussels just seems to lack the cohesiveness that partypolitical ideology produces (and usually makes it utilizable) in national administrative 20 See Annex Q4. It is not completely clear though if all respondents interpreted the question in a coherent way. The results of the semi-structured follow-up interviews indicate that some respondents may have understood the word "distributed" in a formal sense (i.e. that there should be fixed quotas and flagging of posts for certain nationalities). Thus, our results may overestimate the negative perception of geographical balance. 21 Online survey; n=1656. For more information, see Annex Q5.
environments. Even if the concern for geographical balance substitutes in some cases merit criteria, there is in the Commission the feeling that nowadays this is of much less strategic importance and considerably less connected with attempts to systematically steer the Commission civil service than this has been the case before the changes brought about by the Kinnock reform.22
Party political affiliation and nationality thus appear of little use for steering the Commission civil service; however, it may still be the case that the substitution of merit criteria for political ones serves the organizational top of the Commission to get their political programs implemented (apart from direct party-political or national links). In such a formal (i.e. non ideological or nationality) sense politicization would allow the organizational leadership to select and promote individuals of their trust to strategic positions within the Commission hierarchy to properly execute whatever the political agenda of the organizational top is. There is no doubt that in the past such formal politicization was common in the Commission. The success story of the presidencies of Jacques Delors is usually explained by just this: his determination to put "his" people to the right positions (Grant 1994) . Recently however Neil Kinnock's reform of human resources management appears to have changed this picture.
Back in the 1980s, the recruitment and selection of, for example, Directors and Directors-General was characterized by low formalization and hence a high degree of discretion at the hands of the individual Commissioners and their cabinets (Coombes 1970: 157; Stevens and Stevens 2001: 82-84; Lequesne 1996: 405; Rogalla 1973: 338) . With the implementation of the Kinnock reforms and the release of the new staff regulations in 2004, individual Commissioners still hold the right to appoint the senior management within their DG, but they have significantly lost discretionary powers since 'Consultative Committees of Appointments' (CCA) have gained an important say in the (pre)selection of qualified candidates. While the CCA are trying to guarantee the aforementioned balanced geographical distribution, the merit principle and the application of a competitive selection procedure have largely replaced the rather informal appointment practices of the 1980s. Even though Commissioners are not bound to shortlisted CCA candidates, they accept about 95 per cent of the proposed candidates (Egeberg 2006: 38) .
Prior to the Kinnock reforms, also for normal career civil servants seniority and nationality appear to have been more important factors for promotion than the individual performance (Davies 2002: 178; Spence 1997: 75) . Although the new system is highly contested within the Commission, one result seems to be that the politicization of the new procedures has been reduced. At least, the fact that most senior staff now come from within the Commission can be taken as evidence in that direction (Wille 2007: 41) .
It is possible to quantify recent changes in the formal politicization of the Commission by means of an additive index using existing formal organizational rules (see Balint, Bauer and Knill 2008) . Following a scheme based on previous work of KaiUwe Schnapp (2004) the degree of politicization of promotion and selection procedures within the Commission can even be compared to that of national public administrations.23 Balint, Bauer and Knill (2008: 685) One may criticize the selection of the indicators and the attribution of particular values, but the observable trend appears solid: the post-Kinnock Commission's recruitment and promotion rules leave less room for the substitution of merit criteria by political preferences of the superiors than in the time before.
In sum, with respect to direct politicization within the Commission we conclude that party-politics (as could perhaps be expected) plays hardly and nationality politics little role. Formally pure top-down politicization has been strong in the past (compared to other European national civil services). It has however been considerably decreased in the wake of the Kinnock reform. If anything, with respect to direct politicization the Commission administration appears considerably de-politicized.
Professional politicization of Commission officials
Direct politicization assumes that partisan, ideological or national considerations have an impact top-down, i.e. from the leadership to the lower levels of the bureaucratic echelons. Politicization can, however, also work the other way around. Those working in the civil service are usually responsive towards the political requirements of their job, i.e. they take seriously the preferences of those who formally guide them. Civil servants may be responsive to their leaders out of a working ethos, conviction or (no); 3. Senior staff can be dismissed by the minister without cause (yes); 4. Senior staff can be replaced when the government changes (yes); 5. The incumbent minister can appoint senior staff (yes); 6. A formalized cabinet system exists (yes); 7. The appointment of cabinet staff is formalized (no). As regards the Commission, change towards less politicization is due to changes in the indicators 1,2 and 7 which are all coded '0' after the Kinnock reforms. opportunism, but in effect most of them follow in their daily work directions "from above"; they follow the better the clearer the directions are and usually if they have none or no clear ones they try to guess what the directions of the current leadership might be (Manytz 1985: 173-180) . Such professional politicization has been described elsewhere-under the heading of functional politicization -as implying "a greater sensitivity of civil servants for considerations of political feasibility, and institutes a kind of political self-control of top bureaucrats through their anticipation of the reactions of the [domestic] cabinet and of parliament to their policy proposals and legislative drafts" (Mayntz and Derlien 1989: 402) .
What evidence do we find for such functional, professional or anticipatory politicization in case of the European Commission?
A first observation is that because of the Commission's responsibility to initiate policy drafts into the decision-making system of the EU, Commission officials at all levels are ex officio involved in EU policy-making. After all the Commission does not produce number plates, passports or a particular service to citizens, but complex political goods like policy program, management of financial responsibilities of the EU, supervising joint implementation and so on. It may sound trivial, but it should be restated that the Commission is a political organization. Working in the Commission means you are exposed to politics, although the degree of this exposure may vary. As Figure 3 indicates, senior officials are both aware of this political side of their job and the large majority perceives this as a particularly enjoyable aspect of their work. In brief, to the extent that they work on politically contested issues the Commission officials can be viewed as "political" bureaucrats and they like it.24 Especially senior officials in the Commission are thus similar to higher domestic civil servants who work in close contact with the political leaders and who, due to their substantial engagement with the world of politics, naturally deviate from the ideal-type of a purely instrumental bureaucrat (Aberbach et al. 1981:4-6) Asked whether they think it is the responsibility of the services to support the politically-agreed position of the College, the expressed agreement among Commission civil servants is very high, nominally increasing from rank and file, to middle, to top management.25 The self-commitment of the service to College decisions is exemplary, on average 87 percent; certainly a good value of the overall bottom-up loyalty prevailing within the Commission services. Liking the political part of their job and demonstrating great loyalty to political decisions from the top makes Commission officials perfectly fall into the conceptual category of "image II" bureaucrats, i.e. demonstrating a clear ability to distinguish between a power-based and a policy-based understanding of political work (Mayntz 1984: 201) .27 It fits to this picture that only 1/3 of Commission officials asked whether 24 These results are quite similar to the results of interviews conducted with 130 senior civil servants in Germany in 2005, where 61 percent reported to like the political side very much. (Schwanke and Ebinger 2006: 244) . 25 By reporting more commitment to political goals with increasing hierarchical rank, Commission officials display similar characteristics as national civil servants (see Steinkemper 1974: 95-97; Putnam 1976: 213) . 26 For further information, see Annex Q7. 27 Aberbach et al. (1981: 4-23) distinguish four images that vary in their degree of overlap between the 'worlds' and tasks of politicians and bureaucrats. Image I assumes that the tasks of politicians can be clearly separated from bureaucrats. Whereas politicians decide on public policies, civil servants are not active in policy-making and merely administer. Image II acknowledges that both set of actors are active their departmental loyalty overrides their organizational loyalty put the DG interest ahead of the organizational interest in their work.28 Hence, this data is no proof for an outspoken "silo"-mentality, i.e. of parochial culture and lacking inter-departmental cooperation within the Commission. In order to capture the role understanding of Commission officials, we used the categories that Aberbach and colleagues developed in their classical study of national civil servants (1981) . An overview of the roles is displayed in Table 4 . (Aberbach et al. 1981: 9) . Finally Image IV, which refers to purely hybrid bureaucrats, assumes that the roles of politicians and bureaucrats become completely blurred and cannot be distinguished anymore. 28 For more detailed information, see Annex Q8. 29 For the fifth role we used "Representing the EU" instead of the trustee role ("Representative of the state") (Aberbach et al. 1981: 87) . Owing to non-applicability, we omitted the role of an ombudsman and did not ask about the policymaking aspects in our survey.
Our results (see Table 5 ) indicate that the self-perceptions of technical problem solvers (role 1), representatives of the EU (role 5) and brokers that mediate between diverging interests (role 4) are seen as the most accurate descriptions of the work of top-level European civil servants. By contrast, Commission officials see themselves least as agents pushing for a particular or partisan aspect of their job (role 2 and 7).30 Compared to the average role understanding of domestic civil servants in the seven countries reported by the Aberbach team (1981: 89) , the results of our survey are quite similar. However, both the broker role (25 percent points more) and the representative role (22 percent points more) are much more pronounced in the European context. This difference underlines that Commission officials do still perceive themselves as brokers between different national and inter-institutional interests as well as representatives and servants of the greater good of the European project. Aberbach et al. (1981: 89) .
In sum, the average Commission official is very sensitive to the political side of her/his job; s/he is however interested in problem solving more than in pursuing a particular ideological policy solution; s/he goes a long way to assure a pragmatic solution for whatever problem s/he is confronted with; her/his loyalty lies with the official leadership whose directions s/he is happy to follow as s/he has a clear notion of the difference between political and politics. When interviewing Commission officials in this regard, the answer we got most of the time is perhaps best summarised in a comment of a director:
Working for Europe is my first point. We do initiate, but achieving concrete results is my goal. I have to cover a wide range. It is about what you manage to achieve and results, not the impact that happens in the future. The real job of the Commission is to listen, to the Council, to the Parliament, to the people and then make the synthesis trying to make the best proposal and then spend your life negotiating."
Conclusion
The main aim of this chapter was to assemble empirical evidence and use this as a basis to assess the degree to which the European Commission civil service is politicized and thus how one should understand the relationship of Commission bureaucrats and the politics surrounding them.
Our first observation was that the Commission as a supranational institution is more dependent upon its European level peers than it was in the past; especially the powermaximizing Parliament claims greater scrutiny and control over the European Union's "administrative apparatus". While the European Parliament (as any parliament over the world) lacks capacities and (perhaps also) incentives to go into executive minutiae, the Council has been traditionally leading-in programmatic terms-the Commission, and the Lisbon treaty appears to have consolidated its central position. At least, the recent institutional changes (EU foreign minister and permanent president of the European Council) add to the fusion of executive and legislative logics (that is so characteristic for the EU) and appear to strengthen the Council further. The point we want to make in this context is that the Commission's dependency upon Parliament and Council has increased; hence, the College as a political body is thus less autonomous today than in the past.
The second point is that within the Commission important changes have been taken place, too. The College has become unwieldy large so that the idea of an "aréopage" of equals is now clearly illusionary. The college logic has been supplanted by a hierarchal logic embodied in the growing powers of the Commission president. Moreover, the Commission president politically and the Secretariat-General organizationally do indeed use their new top-down management powers.
The third point is to restate that in terms of professional ethos, the Commission civil servants appear politically sensible, but hardly political-ideologically pro-active. They seem politically self-controlled, guided by considerations of political feasibility with sound capacity of anticipating reactions of the consequential players. They are-in Aberbach et al.'s sense-"image II" bureaucrats who are political but little politicized. What is more is that despite the multinational context of EU policy-making, there is little evidence that the missing party-politicization of the Commission civil service has been replaced by something like nationality politics.
The paradox is now that at the same time as the Commission as a supranational institution becomes politically increasingly dependent upon the Parliament and the Council, the Kinnock reform reduces the possibilities of its superiors to "steer" by means of direct politicization. Furthermore, this observation is even more precarious as the members of the Commission College become increasingly subordinated to the Commission president. Our fourth point therefore is that the Kinnock reform makes it more difficult for the organizational top to steer the house by using personnel politics of the kind of direct politicization. The Commission civil service, in other words, has become in this crucial respect more independent and more autonomous.
We thus see an ever less politicized civil service, in an ever more politicized organizational context. At first sight this may be taken as good news since depoliticized civil servants are thought to more likely execute and to deliver what they are asked for by their superiors. At a second glance however problems arise. Because those who should steer the bureaucracy are under greater political pressure, but at the same time they have fewer means than before to direct their apparatus in a top-down way. It thus appears that the separation between College and Commission service 19 intensified. With the autonomy of the service further enhanced, the production of suitable policy programs and problem solutions will depend to a great extent upon the "bottom-up" political sensitivity and sensibility of the bureaucracy. The question however is: will "bottom-up sensitivity" be enough to make the Commission deliver? As long as outside political demands are diffuse, this system may work; once political demands become more consistent, frustrations appear unavoidable. It thus will be interesting to see what are going to be the effects of a further de-politicized bureaucracy operating in an increasingly politicized institutional structure.
